A DISJUNCTIVE SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT IN THE METAVERSE. THE CONFIDENCE PROBLEM OF A DIGITAL DOUBLE

Ерёмина А.А., Alekseev A.Yu.

Abstract

In 2021, Microsoft, Epic Games and Facebook announced the creation of their own meta-universes. The paper presents an interdisciplinary consideration of meta-universe, examines a set of meta-universe characteristics and outlines its main differences from games. The main research question is the trust problem of the digital twin in the meta-universe. The paper addresses this issue from the perspective of the disjunctively skeptical argument and its applicability in the Metaverse. The skeptical argument of the French philosopher René Descartes forms the philosophical basis of the trust problem. The continuation of the skeptical argument is H. Putnam's mental experiment “brains in a barrel”, where the skeptical component of R. Descartes' argument remains, but the content changes. The reasons for the trust problem are the technologies for creating a digital double, allowing one to choose absolutely any appearance and biography for one's avatar. When trusting artificial intelligence systems, we trust the developers and technical support. In the situation of digital twin creation, the issue of trust shifts to the creator, who is a person.

Keywords

metaverse; confidence problem; digital double; avatar; disjunctive skeptical argument.

DOI: 10.31249/scis/2023.03.06

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