This paper has been prepared as a part of a round table discussion on the problem of using artificial intelligence in science on January 18, 2024 at the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In this article, the problem of scientific objectivity is posed in the context of the virtue epistemology. Objectivity is considered in connection with the concept of the subject and some of its philosophical interpretations. Within the framework of the epistemology of virtues, scientific objectivity is interpreted as a virtue practiced by the subject of knowledge, emanating from the subject and imposing moral responsibility for scientific activity on the subject. In this perspective, objectivity has the features of praxis, so it cannot be practiced by artificial intelligence, which does not assume moral responsibility for the results of its activities. In this regard, the nature of AI is interpreted not as an “extended mind”, but as a tool that appeared as a result of the evolution of human culture. In conclusion, the reasoning is given that in order to interpret the concept of objectivity, a subject with body and assuming ethical obligations for his actions is necessary, therefore, the requirements of scientific objectivity for artificial intelligence are meaningless, and AI itself cannot become a full-fledged actor in the research process, however it is a useful tool for improving its effectiveness.
artificial intelligence; subject; objectivity; virtues; epistemology; evolutionism.